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Abstract
In contrast to Mandler’s (1999a; Theorem 6) impossibility result about
the Sraffian indeterminacy of the steady-state equilibrium, we first show
that any regular Sraffian steady-state equilibrium is indeterminate in
terms of Sraffa (1960) under the simple overlapping generation economy.
Moreover, we also check that this indeterminacy is generic. These results
are obtained by explicitly defining a simple model of overlapping gener-
ation economies with Leontief production techniques, in which we also
explain the main source of the difference between our results and Mandler
(1999a; section 6).
JEL Classification Code : B51, D33, D50.
Keywords : Sraffian indeterminacy
1 Introduction
It is well-known that Sraffa’s (1960) system of equilibrium price equations con-
tains one more unknown than equation, which leads to the indeterminacy of
the steady-state equilibrium. This Sraffian indeterminacy has been regarded
as a basis to argue that some non-market-competitive force is indispensable to
determine the factor income distribution between capital and labor, which also
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sets equilibrium prices of commodities. Mandler (1999a) critically examined
Sraffian indeterminacy by embedding the Sraffian system of price equations in
a general equilibrium framework. In section 3 of his study, Mandler confirmed
the generic indeterminacy of equilibria under the condition of fixed production
coefficients, time varying prices and the price inelastic supply of endowments.
However, unlike the claim of Sraffa (1960), in section 6 of Mandler (1999a), he
argued that the steady-state equilibria are generically determinate if only the
labor endowment is fixed and physical commodities are supplied elastically.1 2
The steady-state model in section 6 of Mandler (1999a) presumes a struc-
ture of overlapping generations of agents with 2-periods lives. In this paper we
reproduce the underlying narrative of this overlapping economic structure de-
fined in section 6 of Mandler (1999a). A simple overlapping generation model is
constructed, in which each generation consists of a single representative agent,
who lives for two periods. The agent works only in his youth. In his old age,
the agent is retired and purchases consumption goods from the wealth due to
his past savings.
In such a model, given the same definition of steady-state equilibrium as
Mandler (1999; section 6, p. 705), we show that a steady-state equilibrium is
generically indeterminate, unlike the result of Mandler (1999a; section 6). This
general possibility is due to the fact that the system of equations characterizing
the steady-state equilibrium still preserves one degree of freedom as it contains
one more unknown than equations. This is because, unlike Mandler (1999a;
section 6; p. 705), the (reduced form of) Walras’ law can make one equilibrium
equation redundant under the standard assumption of strongly monotonic utility
functions. The equilibrium price equations, the equations of commodity market
clearing, and the reduced form of the Walras’ law together imply the equation
of the labor market equilibrium.
In the rest of this paper, section 2 provides a review of the literature on
indeterminacy issues in Walrasian general equilibrium theory and Sraffian eco-
nomics. Section 3 introduces a simple model of overlapping generation economies
and defines the steady-state equilibrium, following Mandler’s own definition
(Mandler, 1999a; section 6, p. 705). Then, section 4 argues the generic in-
determinacy of such an equilibrium and explains under what alternative con-
ditions Mandler’s (1999a; section 6) claim of the opposite conclusion may be
verified. Finally, section 5 provides concluding remarks, where the distinctive
feature of the Sraffian indeterminacy, in comparison with some of the neoclassi-
cal indeterminacy, is discussed. The general existence theorem of a steady-state
equilibrium is provided in the Appendix.
1As Mandler (1999a, p. 699) himself points out, the Walrasian system of general equi-
librium has an inherent problem of overdetermination: when the endowment of reproducible
means of production is arbitrarily given, the system of equations is overdetermined under the
uniform rate of profit. For further details of the implications of this issue, see Eatwell (1999),
Garegnani (1990) and Petri (2004).
2The generic determinacy theorem applied in Mandler (1999a) is found in Mas-Colell
(1985), Theorem 8.7.3, where technology is described by linear activities and where a subset
of commodity excess demands can be (locally) inelastic with respect to price.
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2 A brief literature review
In the historic work by Debreu (1970),3 it was proven that exchange economies
have only a finite number of Walrasian equilibria. This means that theWalrasian
equilibrium prices and allocations change smoothly as a function of the para-
meters representing economic environments, so that agents in large economies
can have only a negligible effect on equilibrium prices; i.e. there is no longer an
incentive for market manipulation. In Debreu (1972), under the assumption of
smooth preference ordering, the existence of a generic set of regular economies
is proven. For production economies, Mas-Colell (1975) and Kehoe (1980, 1982)
established generic determinacy for constant returns to scale technologies and
for linear activity analysis. This implies that determinacy is now generic with
almost any type of technology regardless of inelasticity in factor supply. For
the model of an incomplete market with a nominal asset, generic determinacy
is established in Geanakoplos and Plemarchakis (1987) and Balasko and Cass
(1989).
In Mandler (1995), the genericity of sequential indeterminacy was estab-
lished. Using Radner’s (1972) method to decompose an intertemporal equilib-
rium into a sequential one, the second period production activity vector can
be fixed in the second period continuation equilibrium by the vector of factors
endowed and produced in the first period. Therefore, the continuation equilib-
rium condition consists of the second-period equilibrium price equations and the
equations of the second-period excess demand condition for consumption goods,
where the only unknown variables are the second-period prices of consumption
goods and factors. Under this structure, it is shown that if an intertempo-
ral equilibrium has fewer activities using positively priced second period factors
than the number of those factors (implicitly degenerated), then there is a generic
set of economies such that the continuation equilibrium of almost every induced
second-period economy is indeterminate; and if it is not implicitly degenerated,
then the continuation equilibrium of almost every induced second-period econ-
omy is regular. In Mandler (1997), the determinacy of both the intertemporal
equilibria and the endogenously generated second period equilibria is verified
under differentiable production technology.
This conclusion of generic sequential indeterminacy results from the assump-
tions of linear activities, the production of a fixed quantity, and the investment
of part of the first period products into the second period production. These
features are also observed in Sraffa’s (1960) model. Given the same features,
Mandler (1999a) investigated Sraffa’s indeterminacy claim for an equilibrium
with a non-stationary price vector. This equilibrium is defined by the zero-profit
condition for a non-stationary price vector and the excess demand conditions
for commodities and factors by reflecting Hahn’s (1982) criticism of stationary
prices and the lack of the demand side in the original model of Sraffa (1960). It
has a similar structure to the above-mentioned sequential second-period equi-
librium, in that the equilibrium production activity vector is exogenously fixed
3For further details, see Mandler (1999b)
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by the endowment vector of factors given at the beginning of a production pe-
riod. The only unknown variables in the system of equilibrium equations for the
zero-profit and excess demand conditions are the prices of commodities, a wage
rate, and an interest rate. In such an equilibrium, the Sraffian indeterminacy
is observed whenever the total number of commodity inputs, labor, and finan-
cial capital with positive prices is greater than the number of activities used in
production. In particular, the former is n + 1 while the latter is n in a sim-
ple Leontief production model without any alternative production technique or
joint production, so that one-dimensional indeterminacy is generically observed,
as shown by Mandler (1999a, section 3).
Mandler (1999a, section 6) also examined the possibility of Sraffian indeter-
minacy for steady-state equilibria in an overlapping generation economy with
a simple Leontief production model. In this case, no analogical reasoning de-
veloped in the above argument of sequential equilibrium can be applied, as
the equilibrium production activity vector should be endogenously determined
while the price vector of commodity inputs is equal to that of commodity out-
puts. Mandler (1999a, section 6) argued that in this case, generic determinacy
is observed, as the number of equilibrium equations and unknown variables
is identical because none of the market-clearing equations are redundant in a
long-run OLG setting.
In contrast to the last argument by Mandler (1999a, section 6), in the fol-
lowing sections, we will show that one-dimensional Sraffian indeterminacy is
generically observed even for the steady-state equilibria in the same OLG set-
ting. The main reason is that the standard Walras’ law can still work to make
one market-clearing equation redundant.
3 An overlapping generation economy in section
6 of Mandler (1999a)
A simple overlapping generation model is constructed, in which each generation
t = 1, 2, . . . , is a single individual who lives for two periods. The individual works
only in his youth and in his old age is retired and so purchases consumption
goods from the wealth due to his past saving. Let ωl be the labor endowment of
one generation. There are n commodities which are produced in this economy
and used as consumption goods or capital goods, respectively. Let (A,L) be a
Leontief production technique prevailing in this economy, where A is a n×n non-
negative square, productive and indecomposable matrix of reproducible input
coefficients and L is a 1 × n positive row vector of direct labor coefficients.
Finally, let u : Rn+ × Rn+ → R be a welfare function of lifetime consumption
activities, which is common to all generations. As usual, u is assumed to be
continuous and strongly monotonic. Thus, an overlapping generation economy
is given by a profile h(A,L) ;ωl;ui.
For each period t, let pt ∈ Rn+ represent a vector of prices of n commodities
prevailing at the end of this period; wt ∈ R+ represent a wage rate prevailing at
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the end of this period; and rt ∈ R+ represent an interest rate prevailing at the
end of this period. Assume also, for each generation t, that lt ∈ R+ represents
t’s labor supplied at the beginning of their youth; ωt+1 ∈ Rn+ represents a
commodity bundle for the purpose of saving monetary value ptωt+1, which will
be chosen by generation t at the end of their youth and will be used in their
old age; δt+1 ∈ Rn+ represents a commodity bundle purchased for the purpose
of speculative activities by generation t at the end of their old age; yt+1 ∈ Rn+
represents a production activity vector decided by generation t at the beginning
of their old age; ztb is the consumption bundle consumed by the generation t
in their youth; and zta is the consumption bundle consumed by generation t in
their old age.
Each generation t in their youth is faced with the following optimization pro-
gramMP t: for a given sequence of price vectors {(pt, wt, rt) , (pt+1, wt+1, rt+1)},
max
lt,ωt+1,δt+1,yt+1,ztb,zta
u
¡
ztb, z
t
a
¢
subject to
ptz
t
b + ptωt+1 5 wtlt,
lt 5 ωtl ,
ptδt+1 + ptAyt+1 = ptωt+1, and
pt+1z
t
a 5 pt+1δt+1 + pt+1yt+1 − wt+1Lyt+1.
That is, each generation t can supply lt amount of labor in her youth as a
worker employed by generation t − 1. From the wage income wtlt earned at
the end of her youth, she can save ptωt+1 amount of money and can purchase
a consumption bundle ztb. By using the saved money ptωt+1, generation t at
the beginning of her old age can purchase δt+1 for speculative purposes and can
purchase a vector of capital goods Ayt+1 as a productive investment. As an
industrial capitalist, she can employ Lyt+1 amount of generation t+ 1’s labor.
Then, at the end of her old age, she can earn pt+1δt+1 as the revenue of the
speculative investment and can earn pt+1yt+1−wt+1Lyt+1 as the return on the
productive investment. From these revenues, she can purchase a consumption
bundle zta.
Let
¡
lt,ωt+1, δt+1, yt+1, ztb, zta
¢
be a solution to the optimization program
MP t for each generation t. At the optimum, all of the weak inequalities in the
above constraints should hold with equality, given the assumption of u. That
is,
ptz
t
b + ptωt+1 = wtlt,
lt = ωtl , and
pt+1z
t
a = pt+1δt+1 + pt+1yt+1 − wt+1Lyt+1.
Note that the production activity vector yt, planned by generation t − 1
at the beginning of old age, should satisfy the profit maximization condition.
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As market prices should satisfy the zero-profit condition in equilibrium, the
following condition holds for every period t:
pt 5 (1 + rt) pt−1A+ wtL.
Therefore, the profit maximization condition in equilibrium for every period t
is represented by:
pty
t = (1 + rt) pt−1Ay
t + wtLy
t.
Thus, the revenue constraint pt+1zta = pt+1δt+1 + pt+1yt+1 − wt+1Lyt+1 of
generation t at the end of the old age can be reduced to
pt+1z
t
a = pt+1δt+1 + (1 + rt+1) ptAyt+1.
Given a pair of sequence of price vectors (p,w, r) ≡ {(pt, wt, rt)}t≥0, let
(ztb (p,w, r) , z
t
a (p,w, r)) be a solution of the generations t = 1, 2, . . . , to the
problem MP t of utility maximization under the budget constraint. Then, a
competitive equilibrium can be formulated as follows.
Definition 1: A competitive equilibrium under the overlapping generation econ-
omy h(A,L) ;ωl;ui is a pair of sequence of price vectors (p,w, r) ≡ {(pt, wt, rt)}t≥0
and sequence of each generation’s optimal actions
©¡
ωt+1, yt+1, δt+1, ztb (p,w, r) , zta (p,w, r)
¢ª
t≥0
satisfying the following conditions:
pt 5 (1 + rt) pt−1A+ wtL (∀t) ; (1.1)
δt + yt = zt (p,w, r) + ωt+1 (∀t) ; (1.2)
where zt (p,w, r) ≡ ztb (p,w, r) + zt−1a (p,w, r) is the aggregate consumption demands at each t;
δt +Ayt 5 ωt (∀t) ; (1.3)
and Lyt 5 ωtl (∀t) . (1.4)
In the above definition, the excess demand condition in commodity markets
is given by (1.2). In each period t, the aggregate consumption demand vector
is given by zt (p,w, r) = ztb (p,w, r) + z
t−1
a (p,w, r). It may contain some
zero components. For commodity i such that zti (p,w, r) = 0, it follows that in
equilibrium, δti + yti = ωt+1i . In the inequality of excess demand condition (1.2)
above, yt is the gross output vector which is planned by generation t− 1 at the
beginning of period t and is harvested at the end of this period, while δt is the
commodity bundle purchased by generation t − 1 at the beginning of period t
and is sold by generation t− 1 at the end of period t.
In each period t, the capital market equilibrium condition is given by (1.3)
of Definition 1. Note that the choice between the speculative investment δt and
the productive investment Ayt is made by generation t− 1 at the beginning of
old age. Moreover, the bundle of saving commodities ωt is chosen by generation
t− 1 at the end of the young age.
In each period t, the labor market equilibrium condition is given by (1.4) of
Definition 1. Note that the aggregate labor demand Lyt is chosen by generation
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t−1 in their old age, while the aggregate labor supply ωtl is given by generation
t at the young age.
Mandler (1999a; section 6) is interested in examining the robustness of the
Sraffian indeterminacy for a specific long run feature of competitive equilibrium
where all of the investment activities are simply replacements. Such a long run
feature is given as a steady-state equilibrium, where (pt, wt, rt), yt, and δt are
constant throughout the whole periods. In such a case, given a pair of sequence
of price vectors (p,w, r) ≡ {(pt, wt, rt)}t≥0 such that (pt, wt, rt) = (p,w, r)
for every period t, the solution (ztb (p,w, r) , z
t
a (p,w, r)) of generations t =
1, 2, . . . , to the optimization problem MP t can be represented by ztb (p,w, r) =
zb (p,w, r) and zta (p,w, r) = za (p,w, r) for every generation t. Correspond-
ingly, the aggregate demand function zt (p,w, r) = ztb (p,w, r) + z
t−1
a (p,w, r)
for every period t can be represented by zt (p,w, r) = z (p,w, r). Such an
equilibrium is given by Mandler (1999a; section 6) as follows.
Definition 2 [Mandler (1999a, section 6; Definition D6.2)]: A steady-
state equilibrium under the overlapping economy h(A,L) ;ωl;ui is a competitive
equilibrium (p,w, r) associated with©¡
ωt+1, yt+1, δt+1, ztb (p,w, r) , zta (p,w, r)
¢ª
t≥0 ,
such that there exists a profile of a stationary price vector (p,w, r), a gross out-
put vector y ≥ 0, and a speculative activity vector δ = 0, satisfying (pt, wt, rt) =
(p,w, r), yt+1 = y, δt+1 = δ, ωt+1 = Ay + δ, ztb (p,w, r) = zb (p,w, r), and
zta (p,w, r) = za (p,w, r) for every t, and the following conditions hold:
p 5 (1 + r) pA+ wL; (a)
y = z (p,w, r) +Ay, (b)
where z (p,w, r) = zb (p,w, r) + za (p,w, r) ; and
Ly 5 ωl. (c)
Let us introduce a specific case of a steady-state equilibrium, which is defined
as follows.
Definition 3 [Mandler (1999a, section 6; Definition D6.2)]: A steady-
state equilibrium ((p,w, r) , y) under the overlapping economy h(A,L) ;ωl;ui is
called Sraffian if and only if all of the conditions (a), (b), and (c) in Definition
2 hold in equality.
In the above definitions of these three types of equilibria, we simply assume
that the individual choice between speculative investment δt and productive
investment Ayt is the consequence of each generation’s optimal action in the
program MP t. We impose no restriction on that choice. Therefore, even for
Definitions 2 and 3, δ > 0 may be compatible with those equilibrium notions.
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However, we will see that δ = 0 should hold under the steady-state equilibrium
whenever the equilibrium interest rate r is positive.
To see this last point, let us consider under what conditions in general the
market equilibrium holds with no speculative activity, δt = 0 (∀t). Note that
if the whole monetary wealth pt−1ωt of generation t− 1 is used for productive
investment, she would earn (1 + rt) pt−1ωt, while if it is used for speculative
investment, she would earn ptωt. Therefore, allocating her whole monetary
wealth to productive investment is an optimal action for generation t− 1 at the
beginning of her old age if and only if (1 + rt) pt−1ωt = ptωt. In general, if
(1 + rt) pt−1 = pt
holds for every period t = 1, . . ., then δt = 0 is an optimal action for every
generation t − 1 at the beginning of the old age. Thus, under the steady-state
equilibrium, this inequality condition holds automatically, as (1 + r) p = p holds
whenever r = 0. However, if r = 0, then the generation is indifferent between
speculative investment and productive investment, and so δ ≥ 0 may constitute
a steady-state equilibrium associated with r = 0. In contrast, if r > 0, then
the productive investment is strictly preferred to the speculative investment for
every generation t under the steady-state equilibrium. Thus, δ = 0 should hold
under the steady-state equilibrium whenever r > 0.
4 Indeterminacy of the steady-state equilibrium
In this section, we show that a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium is generically
indeterminate, given Definition 3. Firstly, again following Mandler (1999a), let
us formulate the notion of indeterminacy in this model.
Definition 4 (Mandler (1999a)): Let h(A,L) ;ωl;ui be an overlapping gener-
ation economy as specified above. Then, a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium
((p,w, r) , y) under this economy is indeterminate if for any ε > 0, there is a
Sraffian steady-state equilibrium ((p0, w0, r0) , y0) such that (p0, w0, r0) 6= (p,w, r)
and k(p0, w0, r0)− (p,w, r)k < ε.
Let the profile ((p,w, r) , y) be a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium. It can be
shown that it is indeterminate. To see this point, let us examine the system
of equations that characterizes the Sraffian steady-state equilibrium, which is
given as follows:
p = (1 + r) pA+ wL; (1)
y = z (p,w, r) +Ay; (2) and
Ly = ωl. (3)
Note that (1) has n equations, (2) has n equations, and (3) has one equation.
In contrast, there are n unknown variables regarding the vector y and there
are (n − 1) + 2 unknown variables regarding (p,w, r), assuming hereafter that
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commodity n is selected as the numeraire. Therefore, there are 2n+1 unknown
variables in the system of 2n + 1 equations. However, we can decrease the
number of equations using Walras’ law. Based on this fact, we can show the
indeterminacy of the Sraffian steady-state equilibrium in terms of Definition 4.
Given a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium ((p,w, r) , y), define p¯ ≡ ( p1pn , ..., pn−1pn , 1)
and the associated system of equilibrium equations as follows:
F (p¯, w, r, y) ≡
∙
z(p,w, r)− [I −A] y
(p¯− (1 + r)p¯A− wL)T
¸
.
By the definition of Sraffian steady state-equilibrium, F (p¯, w, r, y) = 0 holds.
Next, let us introduce the notion of regular equilibria.
Definition 5 (Mandler (1999a)): Let h(A,L) ;ωl;ui be an overlapping gener-
ation economy as specified above. Then, a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium
((p,w, r) , y) under this economy is regular if the Jacobian of F (p¯, w, r, y) = 0
has full row rank.
Now, we are ready to argue the indeterminacy of Sraffian steady-state equi-
libria, which is summarized as follows:
Theorem 1: Let h(A,L) ;ωl;ui be an overlapping generation economy as spec-
ified above, and let ((p,w, r) , y) be a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium under
this economy. Then, it is indeterminate whenever it is regular.
Proof. In the overlapping generation economy, Walras’ law is generally given
by the following equation:£
pt
¡
ztb + z
t−1
a
¢
+ ptωt+1
¤
−
£
ptδt + (1 + rt) pt−1Ayt + wtωtl
¤
= 0, (4)
which is derived from the aggregation of ptztb+ ptωt+1−wtωtl = 0 and ptzt−1a −
ptδt− (1 + rt) pt−1Ayt = 0. Moreover, (4) can be reduced to the following form
under stationary prices:£
p
¡
ztb + z
t−1
a
¢
+ pωt+1
¤
−
£
pδt + (1 + r) pAyt + wωtl
¤
= 0. (4a)
Note that (4a) can be rewritten to the following form:£
p
¡
ztb + z
t−1
a
¢
+ pAyt+1 + pδt+1
¤
−
£
pδt + (1 + r) pAyt + wωtl
¤
= 0. (4b)
As ztb = zb, z
t−1
a = za, and yt+1 = yt = y hold for every t under the steady-state,
(4b) can be reduced to£
p (zb + za) + pδt+1
¤
−
£
pδt + rpAy + wωl
¤
= 0. (4b*)
Furthermore, δt+1 = δt = δ also holds for every t under the steady-state. Indeed,
ωt+1 = ωt = ω holds in the steady-state. Thus, as δt +Ayt = ω holds for every
t whenever p > 0, yt+1 = yt = y implies δt+1 = δt = δ. Finally, p > 0
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follows from the definition of Sraffian steady-state equilibrium prices (1), given
the assumption of productive and indecomposable A and the positivity of L.
Thus, (4b*) can be reduced to
p (zb + za)− [rpAy + wωl] = 0. (4c)
Let us take a profile ((p,w, r) , y) satisfying the system of equations (1) and
(2). From (2), we have
py = pz (p,w, r) + pAy (5)
where z (p,w, r) = zb (p,w, r) + za (p,w, r) .
By combining (1), (5) can be written as:
pz (p,w, r) = p (I −A) y = rpAy + wLy. (5a)
Note that the profile ((p,w, r) , y) meets Walras’ law (4c), which implies that
pz (p,w, r) = rpAy + wωl. (6)
From (5) and (6), we obtain the equation (3):
Ly = ωl.
Thus, the system of 2n+1 equations (1), (2), and (3) characterizing the Sraffian
steady-state equilibrium ((p,w, r) , y) can be reduced to the system of 2n equa-
tions (1) and (2), given the reduced form of Walras’ law (4c). Then, since the
system of 2n equations has 2n+ 1 unknown variables, it has freedom of degree
one.
If the equilibrium ((p,w, r) , y) is regular, then the Jacobian matrix of the
system of equations (1) and (2) at ((p,w, r) , y) has rank 2n. Therefore, we
can show the indeterminacy of the Sraffian steady-state equilibrium by apply-
ing the implicit function theorem (A detailed proof is given in Theorem A2 of
Appendix).
Remember that, given the same definition of steady-state equilibrium as
Definition 2, Mandler (1999a; section 6) argues that such an equilibrium is
determinate, which is incompatible with Theorem 1. He seems to reach this
conclusion by the following reasoning: “Due to the way in which 1 + r appears
in Walras’ law, the standard argument that one of the equilibrium conditions
is redundant is not valid in the present model” (Mandler, 1999a; section 6; p.
705). However, Mandler’s argument is not valid, at least for Sraffian steady-
state equilibria, in economies where Walras’ law (4) holds, as it overlooks the
point that one equation (3) can be eliminated by the reduced form of Walras’
law (4c).
Note that an alternative scenario may follow if Walras’ law (4) is not ensured.
For instance, if the utility function is satiated, then it would be possible for
the budget constraint at period t of the old generation t − 1 to not hold with
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equality: pzt−1a −
£
pδt + (1 + r) pAyt
¤
< 0. In such a case, the reduced form
(4c) of Walras’ law cannot be obtained. Therefore, we could not derive equation
(3) from (1) and (2) under Walras’ law, and so the indeterminacy of the Sraffian
steady-state equilibrium may not be verified. This may suggest that Mandler’s
(1999a) claim of generic determinacy for the steady state equilibrium could be
verified if Walras’ law does not hold.
4.1 Openness and genericity
Next, we examine the openness and genericity of parameter set of economies in
which every steady-state equilibrium is regular. The openness and genericity
are related to the stability and coverage of indeterminacy in the perturbation
of parameters characterizing the set of economies.
For the demand function of two generations za, zb, labor endowment ω` and
for h = (h1, h2, ..., hn, ho) ∈ Rn+1, define a perturbed demand function with
similar form to Mandler (1999a) as
zi(h) ≡ zbi (h) + zai (h)
where
zbi (h) ≡ zbi (p,w, r) +
w
pi
hi, z
a
i (h) ≡ zai (p,w, r) +
w
pi
ho
for each i = 1, 2, ..., n.
In order to preserve Walras’ law and homogeneity, the perturbation of labor
endowment is given as ωl(h) ≡ ω` +
Pn
i=1 hi +
nho
1+r .
Now define a function F on the space of n+1 price variables (p¯, w, r) where
p¯ ≡ (p1, ...pn−1, 1), n quantity variables (y1, y2, ...yn), and adding the parameter
set (A,L, h) to R2n, i.e.
F : Rn−1++ ×R++ ×R+ ×Rn++ ×Rn
2
+ ×Rn++ ×Rn+1 → R2n
such that
F (p¯, w, r, y, A,L, h) =
∙
z(h)− [I −A] y
(p¯− (1 + r)p¯A− wL)T
¸
.
Definition 6: An economy is a profile of (A,L, h) where (A,L) is a Leontief
production technique, in which A is n× n non-negative square, productive and
indecomposable matrix of reproducible input coefficients, L is 1 × n positive
row vector of direct labor coefficients, and h = (h1, h2, ..., hn, ho) ∈ Rn+1 is for
perturbation.
An economy (A,L, h) is regular if every Sraffian steady-state equilibrium
((p,w, r) , y) is regular, that is, the Jacobian DF has full-rank at (p¯, w, r, y).
Denote the set of economies as P and the set of regular economies as PR.
Theorem 2: PR is open and has full measure in P .
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Proof. Before examining whether PR has full measure, let’s first check whether
the JacobianDF has full rank with respect to p1, ...pn−1, w, r, y1, ..., yn in order
to check the regularity of an equilibrium whenever the economy (A,L, h) has the
property that L cannot be the Frobenius eigenvector of A. The system of equa-
tions above has 2n equations and n+1 price variables (p1, ..., pn−1, w, r). Hence,
the quantity variables (y1, ..., yn) are to be determined simultaneously in the Ja-
cobian. Including perturbed parameters, for any (A,L, h),D(p¯,y,w,r)(FA,L,h(p¯, w, r, y))
is given by:
⎡
⎣
[A− I] Dp¯z(h) Dwz(h) Drz(p,w, r)
0 I∗n−1 − (1 + r)AT−n −LT − (p¯A)
T
⎤
⎦
where
Dp¯z(h) =Dp¯z(p¯, w, r)−
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
w
p21
(h1 + h
o) 0 ... 0
0 w
p22
(h2 + h
o) 0 ... 0
. . .
0 ... 0 w
p2n−1
(hn−1 + h
o) 0
0 ... 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
Dwz(h) =Dwz(p¯, w, r) + [
1
p1
(h1+ h
o),
1
p2
(h2+ h
o), ...,
1
pn−1
(hn−1+ h
o),0 ]T ,
AT is the transpose of A and AT−n is the n×(n− 1) matrix obtained by deleting
the n-th column of AT , and
I∗n−1 =
∙
In−1
0
¸
.
Here, note that the last rows of Dp¯z(h) and Dwz(h) are nonzero because
the last rows of Dp¯z(p,w, r) and Dwz(p,w, r) are non-zero. As we observed in
the calculation result above, the Jacobian has full rank of 2n unless the vectorsh
0 I∗n−1 − (1 + r)AT−n −LT − (p¯A)
T
i
are linearly dependent. Note that
the linear dependence of the vectors is observed only in the exceptional case
that L becomes the Frobenius eigenvector of A.
The full-measure claim of PR is proven by the transversality theorem. Let’s
consider the perturbation of parameters (A,L, h) in Rn2+ ×Rn++×Rn+1. If 0 is a
regular value of F at (p¯, w, r, y) andDF has full rank 2n with respect to (A,L, h)
in Rn2+ × Rn++ × Rn+1, then except for a set of (A0, L0, h0) ∈ Rn
2
+ ×Rn++ ×Rn
of measure zero, FA,L,h(p¯, w, r, y) : Rn−1++ × R++ × R+ × Rn → R2n has 0 as a
regular value.
Define the Jacobian DF with respect to (A,L, h), which is denoted by
DA,L,hF , as below:
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DA,L,hF =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
w
p1
0 wp1 y
T
. . . 0
w
pn−1
0 wpn−1
. . .
0 wpn
w
pn
yT
0 (*) −wIn
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
where the row vector yT is the transpose of y, In is the n× n identity matrix,
(∗) = −(1 + r)[p1In ... pn−1In In] is n×n2 matrix. Here, each piIn is an n× n
matrix:
piIn =
⎡
⎢⎣
pi 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 pi
⎤
⎥⎦ .
The first n+ 1 columns are for (h1, ..., hn, ho), the next n2 columns are for
the components of A and the last n columns are for the components of L. We
can see that the above matrix has full-rank.
As for openness, consider the contrary case. Suppose PR is not open.
Then there exists a sequence {(A,L, h)k} of non-regular economies converg-
ing to a regular economy (A,L, h)∗ ∈ PR. Correspondingly, there exists a
sequence of non-regular equilibria {(p¯, r, w, y)k} which converges to a regular
equilibrium (p¯, r, w, y)∗ at (A,L, h)∗. Then the corresponding Jacobian matri-
ces DF(A,L,h)k(p¯, w, r, y)k of 2n rows and 2n+1 columns exist, which have less
than full rank. For a Jacobian matrix, we can pick 2n + 1 separate square
submatrices of order 2n. The determinants of square submatrices of order 2n
are all zero. Now we can define a continuous function, say c, from the set of
Jacobian matrices to the set of 2n + 1-dimensional vectors whose components
are determinants of square submatrices derived from the Jacobian DFA,L,h.
Since c(DFA,L,h) = (0, ..., 0) ∈ R2n+1 for any DFA,L,h of less than full rank,
c(DF(A,L,h)k(p¯, w, r, y, g)k) = (0, ..., 0)k → (0, ..., 0) ∈ R
2n+1 as k→∞.
Since {(0, ..., 0)k} converging to (0, ..., 0) is closed in R2n+1 and c is con-
tinuous, the inverse image c−1 ({(0, ..., 0)k}) =
©
DF(A,L,h)k(p¯, w, r, y, g)k
ª
is
closed. Its elements are Jacobian matrices from P\PR of less than full rank.
Since
©
DF(A,L,h)k(p¯, w, r, y, g)k
ª
is closed,DF(A,L,h)∗(p¯, w, r, y, g)∗ is contained
in
©
DF(A,L,h)k(p¯, w, r, y, g)k
ª
.
Note that c(DF(A,L,h)∗(p¯, w, r, y, g)∗) = (0, ..., 0) ∈ R
2n+1. This implies that
the converging point of the sequence
©
DF(A,L,h)k(p¯, w, r, y, g)k
ª
, each element
of which is correspondingly defined from (A,L, h)k ∈ P\PR, must also have
less than full rank. In other words, the convergent point of the sequence of
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non-regular economies must also be non-regular. This contradicts our initial
assumption. Therefore, the set of regular economies PR is open.
5 Concluding Remarks
In the above argument, we have shown that under the same overlapping genera-
tion economy as Mandler (1999a; section 6), Sraffian indeterminacy generically
occurs in the Sraffian steady-state equilibrium, unlike Mandler’s (1999a; section
6) claim. This possibility theorem may be due to the strong monotonicity as-
sumption of individual utility functions in this paper. As mentioned in section
3, if the utility function is allowed to be satiated, the generic determinacy for
the steady-state equilibrium may be observed.
Remember that indeterminacy arises in many places in neoclassical eco-
nomics, such as the overlapping-generations indeterminacy and factor-price in-
determinacy summarized by Mandler (2002). However, the Sraffian indetermi-
nacy observed in this paper has a distinctive feature in comparison with such
neoclassical types.
Firstly, the overlapping-generations indeterminacy, such as Calvo (1978) and
Kehoe and Levine (1990), summarized by Mandler (2002) is characterized as
the continuum set of equilibrium price sequences that results from the arbitrari-
ness of initial commodity prices. However, all of the equilibrium price sequences
converge uniquely to the common steady-state price. In contrast, here we focus
on the case where an equilibrium price sequence constantly consists of a steady-
state equilibrium price vector, from the infinite past until the infinite future.
However, a continuum set of steady-state equilibrium prices is observed due to
the continuum of factor income distributions. This suggests that the Sraffian
indeterminacy and the overlapping-generations indeterminacy are quite differ-
ent.
Secondly, regarding factor-price indeterminacy, the mechanism to derive one
dimension of indeterminacy in the model of three factors and two outputs dis-
cussed by Mandler (2002) is essentially the same as that discussed by Mandler
(1999a, section 3). That is, all three factors can be interpreted so that two
of them are reproducible commodities, the same types as output commodities,
and the other is labor, but the equilibrium prices are not the steady-state ones.
Another typical interpretation would be that all of the factors are primary ones.
In contrast, here we focus on the steady-state equilibrium of the economy where
labor is the unique primary factor, capital is a bundle of multiple reproducible
commodities, and the equilibrium prices are stationary. Moreover, the main
source of factor-price indeterminacy is the price-inelastic supply of all produc-
tive factors under the fixed production coefficients, which can fix the equilibrium
outputs. The remaining unknowns are only the prices associated with a smaller
number of price equations. In contrast, the generic indeterminacy discussed
here is observed under the conditions that the only price-inelastically supplied
factor is labor, and the capital endowments are endogenously determined simul-
taneously with the determination of equilibrium outputs. Again, the Sraffian
14
indeterminacy discussed here and the factor-price indeterminacy are quite dif-
ferent.
Given the generic indeterminacy of steady-state equilibria in the simple
Leontief production model, the natural next question would be whether this
indeterminacy is robust in more general models. There may be at least two
interesting more general models: a production model with alternative Leontief
techniques to represent economies with the possibility of technical changes; and
the von Neumann production model of economies with joint production. Note
that the discussion developed in section 5 of Mandler (1999a), referring to both
of these models, is irrelevant to this robustness question, as it refers only to
the sequential equilibria with non-stationary prices, as in section 3 of Mandler
(1999a).
For the model with alternative Leontief techniques, it can be verified that
the generic feature of one-dimensional indeterminacy of steady-state equilibria
is still observed. Moreover, it is still true even if the number of alternative
Leontief production techniques is infinite or uncountable. Therefore, unlike the
case of sequential equilibria in Mandler (1997), the differentiability of overall
production techniques cannot affect the generic feature of the indeterminacy for
the case of steady-state equilibria.
For the von Neumann model, unlike the Sraffian equilibrium with a non-
stationary price vector discussed in Mandler (1999a, section 5), but similar to
the standard Walrasian equilibrium discussed in Mas-Collel (1975) and Kehoe
(1980, 1982), the comparison of the number of activities in use with the number
of factors that have positive prices is irrelevant. The former can vary across dif-
ferent equilibrium price vectors even in the case of steady-state equilibria. Given
such features, we conjecture that the generic one-dimensional indeterminacy of
steady-state equilibria is still observed in economies with joint production, but
leave this for future research.
Finally, as Mandler’s (2002) reference to Morishima (1961) indicates, it
would also be interesting to investigate the economic implications of Sraffian
indeterminacy in the context of turnpike theorems, a question that has not
been thoroughly studied in modern general equilibrium theory.
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7 Appendix: The Existence of Sraffian Steady-
State Equilibrium
In this Appendix, we show that, given an economy h(A,L) ;ωl;ui, there exists an
open subset of available non-negative interest rates such that for every interest
rate in this subset, an associated steady-state equilibrium exists. By such an
existence theorem, it is ensured that the generic indeterminacy discussed in
Theorems 1 and 2 is not an empty claim.
Note that if speculative investment were allowed to be non-zero and non-
negative under a steady-state equilibrium, then the commodity market clearing
condition (b) in Definition 2 would be given by the following form:
y + δ = z (p,w, r) +Ay + δ,
which is also the reduced form of condition (1.2) in Definition 1.
Finally, given that the utility function is strongly monotonic, δ ≥ 0 would
appear under the steady-state equilibrium only when the equilibrium interest
rate is zero. Howeover, even when the equilibrium interest rate is zero, δ = 0 is
still an optimal action. Therefore, without loss of generality, we may focus on
the case of no speculative investment when we discuss the indeterminacy of the
Sraffian steady-state equilibrium.
With Definition 2, we can obtain the following existence theorem of the
Sraffian steady-state equilibrium in this overlapping economy.
Theorem A1: Let h(A,L) ;ωl;ui be an economy as specified above. Then,
there exists a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium ((p,w, r) , y (p,w, r)) under this
economy.
Proof. Let us define4 ≡ ©(p,w) ∈ Rn+1+ |Pni=1 pi + w = 1ª and ◦4 ≡ {(p,w) ∈ 4 | (p,w) > 0}.
For each (p,w) ∈ 4, consider the following opmizaition problem:
max
(zb,za,y)
u (zb, za)
subject to
pzb +W 5 wωl,
pAy = W , and
pza 5 max {py − wLy,W} .
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Denote the set of solutions to this optimization problem by O (p,w).
Take (zb (p,w) , za (p,w) , y (p,w)) ∈ O (p,w). Then,
y (p,w) ∈ argmax
½
max
y≥0; pAy=W
py − pAy − wLy, 0
¾
holds. It is also shown that the correspondence O :
◦
4 ³ Rn+ × Rn+ × Rn+ is
non-empty, compact and convex-valued, and upper hemicontinuous.
Let us define the excess demand correspondence D :
◦
4³ Rn by
D (p,w)
≡ {(z (p,w)− (I −A) y (p,w) , Ly (p,w)− ωl) | (zb (p,w) , za (p,w) , y (p,w)) ∈ O (p,w)} .
It can be shown that this correspondence is non-empty, compact and convex-
valued, and upper hemicontinuous. By the strong monotonicity of u, the follow-
ing form of Walras’ law holds: for any (p,w) ∈
◦
4 and any d (p,w) ∈ D (p,w),
(p,w) · d (p,w) = 0.
Let us take any price sequence
©¡
pk, wk
¢ª
⊂
◦
4 such that ¡pk, wk¢ →
(p,w) ∈ 4\
◦
4. Take d ¡pk, wk¢ ∈ D ¡pk, wk¢ for each ¡pk, wk¢.
Suppose that (p,w) ∈ 4\
◦
4 with w > 0. Then, there exists a commodity i
such that pi = 0. Then, for sufficiently large k, pki is sufficiently close to zero.
Then, zi
¡
pk, wk
¢
is sufficiently large by the strong monotonicity of u. In con-
trast, y
¡
pk, wk
¢
is bounded by the condition pkAy
¡
pk, wk
¢
< wkωl. Therefore,
for sufficiently large k, zi ¡pk, wk¢− yi ¡pk, wk¢+Aiy ¡pk, wk¢ > 0 should hold,
where Ai is the i-th row vector of A. Now, let us define (p0, w0) ∈
◦
4 such that
(p0, w0) ≡ 1λ
¡
pk, wk
¢
− 1−λλ (p,w) for some sufficiently small λ ∈ (0, 1). Then,
(p0, w0) · d ¡pk, wk¢ > 0 holds as p0i £zi ¡pk, wk¢− yi ¡pk, wk¢+Aiy ¡pk, wk¢¤ > 0
is sufficiently greater.
Suppose that (p,w) ∈ 4\
◦
4 with w = 0. Then, for sufficiently large k, wk
is sufficiently close to zero. Then, y ¡pk, wk¢ must be sufficiently close to zero
vector as pkAy
¡
pk, wk
¢
< wkωl. Thus, for sufficiently large k, Ly ¡pk, wk¢ < ωl
should hold. Now, let us define (p0, w0) ∈
◦
4 such that (p0, w0) ≡
³
pk
³
1 + ε
1−wk
´
, wk − ε
´
for some sufficiently small ε > 0. Then,
(p0, w0) · d ¡pk, wk¢
=
µ
pk
µ
1 +
ε
1− wk
¶
, wk − ε
¶
· ¡z ¡pk, wk¢− (I −A) y ¡pk, wk¢ , Ly ¡pk, wk¢− ωl¢
=
ε
1− wk p
k · £z ¡pk, wk¢− (I −A) y ¡pk, wk¢¤− ε ¡Ly ¡pk, wk¢− ωl¢
=
wk
1− wk ε
¡
ωl − Ly
¡
pk, wk
¢¢
− ε
¡
Ly
¡
pk, wk
¢
− ωl
¢
> 0.
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In summary, we have shown that for any price sequence
©¡
pk, wk
¢ª
⊂
◦
4
such that
¡
pk, wk
¢
→ (p,w) ∈ 4\
◦
4, and for any d ¡pk, wk¢ ∈ D ¡pk, wk¢, there
exists (p0, w0) ∈
◦
4 such that (p0, w0) · d ¡pk, wk¢ > 0 for infinitely many k.
Then, by Grandmont (1977, Lemma 1), there exists (p∗, w∗) ∈
◦
4 such that
z (p∗, w∗)− (I −A) y (p∗, w∗) = 0 and Ly (p∗, w∗)− ωl = 0. Thus, y (p∗, w∗) =
(I −A)−1 z (p∗, w∗), and so y (p∗, w∗) > 0 by the indecomposability of A, unless
z (p∗, w∗) = 0. Since p∗ > 0 and w∗ > 0, z (p∗, w∗) ≥ 0 follows from the strong
monotonicity of u. Thus, y (p∗, w∗) > 0. Then, for r∗ ≡ p
∗y(p∗,w∗)−Ly(p∗,w∗)
p∗Ay(p∗,w∗) −1,
r∗ = 0 holds from y (p∗, w∗) ∈ argmax {maxy≥0; p∗Ay=W p∗y − p∗Ay − w∗Ly, 0}.
Moreover, it should follow from the optimal behavior and y (p∗, w∗) > 0 that
p∗ = (1 + r∗) p∗A+ w∗L.
Thus, there exists a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium ((p∗, w∗, r∗) , y (p∗, w∗, r∗))
with y (p∗, w∗, r∗) = y (p∗, w∗).
Denote the Frobenius eigenvalue of the matrix A by (1 +R)−1 ∈ (0, 1).
Then, by Theorem A1 and Theorem 1, we have the following existence theorem.
Theorem A2: Let h(A,L) ;ωl;ui be an economy as specified above. Let
((p∗, w∗, r∗) , y (p∗, w∗, r∗)) be a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium, which is reg-
ular. Then, there exists an open neighborhood N (r∗) ⊆ [0, R) of r∗ such that
there exists a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium
((p (r) , w (r) , r) , y (p (r) , w (r) , r))
for every r ∈ N (r∗).
Proof. Let us define a continuously differentiable function F : Rn−1+ × R+ ×
[0, R)×Rn+ → R2n as:
F (p,w, r, y) =
⎡
⎣
z (p,w, r)− [I −A] y
p−n − (1 + r) pA−n − wL−n
Ly − ωl
⎤
⎦ .
Let (p∗, w∗, r∗, y∗) be a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium, whose existence is
ensured by Theorem A1. Assume it is a regular equilibrium. Then, the Jacobian
of F at (p∗, w∗, r∗, y∗) is given by D(y,p,w,r)(F (p∗, w∗, r∗, y∗)) is given by:
D(y,p,w,r)(F (p
∗, w∗, r∗, y∗))
=
⎡
⎣
[A− I] Dpz (p∗, w∗, r∗) Dwz (p∗, w∗, r∗) Drz (p∗, w∗, r∗)
0 In−1 − (1 + r)AT−n −LT−n − (p¯A−n)
T
L 0 0 0
⎤
⎦ .
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As (p∗, w∗, r∗, y∗) is regular, it follows that rank
£
D(y,p,w,r)(F (p
∗, w∗, r∗, y∗))
¤
=
2n.4
Then, by the implicit function theorem, there exist an open neighborhood
N (r∗) ⊂ [0, R) of r∗ and also an open neighborhoodM (p∗, w∗, y∗) ⊂ Rn−1+ ×
R+ × Rn+ of (p∗, w∗, y∗) such that there exists a continuous single-valued map-
ping η : N (r∗) → M (p∗, w∗, y∗) such that for any r0 ∈ N (r∗), there ex-
ists (p0, w0, y0) = η (r0) with F (p0, w0, r0, y0) = 0. By the definition of the
mapping F , F (p0, w0, r0, y0) = 0 implies that p0 · (z (p0, w0, r0)− [I −A] y0) +
w0 · (Ly0 − ωl) = 0. As p0−n = (1 + r0) p0A−n + w0L−n, it also follows that
1 = (1 + r0) p0An + w0Ln. Thus, p0 = (1 + r0) p0A + w0L holds, which im-
plies that (p0, w0, r0, y0) is a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium associated with
r0 ∈ N (r∗).
In this way, we can show that for each non-negative interest rate within a
subset of [0, R), there exists a Sraffian steady-state equilibrium associated with
this interest rate.
8 Addendum: Indeterminacy of the stationary
growth equilibrium
The definition of steady-state equilibrium, Definition 2, presumes that the ag-
gregate net investment of capital is exogenously given to be zero. In this section,
we will introduce an alternative equilibrium notion.
Note that in the case of steady-state equilibrium, gross investment is only
for the replacement, and so no net investment appears. Alternatively, consider
a case where positive net investment may be observed and its ratio to gross
investment is invariant throughout the whole periods. Let g denote the ratio of
net investment to replacement investment and call it an investment growth rate.
Consider an economy of overlapping generations with an endogenous rate, g, of
investment growth. Then, the corresponding long run feature of a competitive
equilibrium with no speculative investment is given as follows.
Definition 7: A stationary growth equilibrium under the overlapping economy
h(A,L) ;ωl;ui is a profile of a stationary price vector (p,w, r), a gross output
vector y ≥ 0, and a common ratio of new to replacement investment g > −1,
such that the following conditions are satisfied:
4As shown in the proof of Theorem 2, the regularity of the equilibrium (p∗, w∗, r∗, y∗)
is indeed verified except for a non-generic case that the vector L becomes the Frobenius
eigenvector of A.
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p 5 (1 + r) pA+ wL; (a*)
y = z (p,w, r; g) + (1 + g)Ay, (b*)
where z (p,w, r; g) ≡ zb (p,w, r) +
za (p,w, r)
1 + g
;
Ly 5 ωl, (c*)
and
pza (p,w, r)
1 + r
= (1 + g)pAy. (d*)
Moreover, a stationary growth equilibrium ((p,w, r) , y, g) under the overlapping
economy h(A,L) ;ωl;ui is called Sraffian if and only if all of the conditions (a*),
(b*), and (c*) hold in equality.
In the above definition, the equation (d*) for the present value of consump-
tion expenditure in old age and gross productive investment is equivalent to
the condition of no speculative investment. This additional requirement is con-
sistent with individual optimization in the equilibria, because it is an optimal
action for every generation to make no speculative investment whenever the
equilibrium price vector of commodities is stationary. Some of the literature on
overlapping generation models treats this condition as a part of the definition
of competitive equilibrium, like Tvede (2010; p. 118; Definition 7.1).
Note that if speculative investment were allowed to be non-zero and non-
negative under the stationary growth equilibrium, then the commodity market
clearing condition in Definition 7 would be given by the following form:
y + δ = z (p,w, r; g) + (1 + g)Ay + (1 + g) δ,
which is the reduced form of the condition (1.2) in Definition 1. If this inequality
logically implied (b*) of Definition 7, then the non-zero and non-negative specu-
lative investment under the stationary growth equilibrium would be compatible
with the standard commodity market clearing condition for the definition of the
stationary growth equilibrium. However, it does not imply (b*): for instance,
in the case of g < 0.
Finally, given that the utility function is strongly monotonic, δ ≥ 0 would
appear under the stationary growth equilibrium only when the equilibrium in-
terest rate is zero. Therefore, without loss of generality, we may focus on the
case of no speculative investment when we discuss the indeterminacy of the
Sraffian stationary growth equilibrium.
Here, the aggregate consumption demand is given by z (p,w, r; g) = zb (p,w, r)+
za(p,w,r)
1+g , where
za(p,w,r)
1+g represents the old generation’s consumption demand
in the present period. The appearance of the denominator in the second com-
ponent of this equation implies that g is also equal to the growth rate of labor
endowments (population), in that the ratio of the old generation’s population
(labor endowment) to the young generation’s is 11+g . The endogenous determi-
nation of population growth is fixed outside of the market mechanism, and so
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it is not specified in the economic model. In the section of concluding remarks,
we will discuss how the endogenous population growth rate would be matched
with the equilibrium investment growth rate under the stationary growth equi-
librium.
8.1 Indeterminacy of the stationary growth equilibrium
Given the Leontief production technique (A,L), let y∗ > 0 be the Frobenius
eigenvector associated with the Frobenius eigenvalue (1 +R)−1 such that it is
normalized to satisfy Ly∗ = 1. This commodity bundle is called the standard
commodity by Sraffa (1960). In this section, we assume that the standard
commodity is adopted as the numeraire of the price system: for any market
price vector p ∈ Rn+, py∗ = 1 is satisfied.
With Definition 7, we can obtain the following existence theorem of the
Sraffian stationary growth equilibrium in this overlapping economy.
Theorem 3: Let h(A,L) ;ωl;ui be an overlapping generation economy as speci-
fied above. Then, for each profit rate r ∈ [0, R), there exists a Sraffian stationary
growth equilibrium ((p,w, r) , y, g) under this economy.
Proof. Let R > 0 be the maximal profit rate under the technique (A,L). As
is well-known, 11+R is the Frobenius eigen value of the productive and indecom-
posable matrix A such that there exists a unique Frobenius eigen vector p∗ > 0
satisfying p∗ = (1 +R) p∗A.
Take any r ∈ [0, R). Then, due to the Sraffian linear distribution function,
we can specify w > 0 as satisfying
r = R (1− w) .
Given (w, r), let
p ≡ wL (1− (1 + r)A)−1 .
Then, it is well-known that in this case, p > 0 and p = (1 + r) pA + wL hold.
That is, we obtain a stationary price vector (p,w, r), which prevails at each and
every period.
Given this price information (p,w, r), consider the program MP t of genera-
tion t. Let (ztb (p,w, r) , z
t
a (p,w, r)) be a solution of generation t to the program
MP t under the stationary prices (p,w, r). But the same solution is also optimal
for generation t−1, as all generations have the same utility function. Therefore,
without loss of generality, we get rid of the superscript “t” in the solution to
each MP t.
Thus, now without loss of generality, let z (p,w, r; g) ≡ zb (p,w, r)+ za(p,w,r)1+g
be the aggregate consumption demand vector, where g > −1 denotes a common
growth rate of outputs. In addition, let
y (p,w, r; g) ≡ [I − (1 + g)A]−1 z (p,w, r; g) .
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Note that sinceA is productive and indecomposable, we have [I − (1 + g)A]−1 >
0 for any g ∈ (−1, R), and so y > 0 holds. Moreover, it follows that
py (p,w, r; g) = (1 + r) pAy (p,w, r; g) + wLy (p,w, r; g)
⇔ pz (p,w, r) + (1 + g) pAy (p,w, r; g) = (1 + r) pAy (p,w, r; g) + wLy (p,w, r; g) .
Since the budget constraint of the program MP t implies that
pzb (p,w, r) +
pza (p,w, r)
1 + r
= wωl,
we can establish Ly (p,w, r; g) = ωl whenever
pza (p,w, r)
1 + r
= (1 + g) pAy (p,w, r; g)
is satisfied. Therefore, let us show that for any r ∈ [0, R), there exists a unique
g (r) such that
pza (p,w, r)
1 + r
= (1 + g (r)) pAy (p,w, r; g (r))
holds.
Let Ψ (r, g) ≡ (1 + g) pAy (p,w, r; g)− pza(p,w,r)1+r . Note that if g is sufficiently
close to −1, then Ψ (r, g) ≈ Ψ (r,−1) < 0. In contrast,
lim
g→R
Ψ (r, g) = +∞
holds, as the matrix [I − (1 + g)A]−1 approaches the singular matrix. Since
Ψ (r, g) is continuous at every g, there exists g (r) such that
pza (p,w, r)
1 + r
= (1 + g (r)) pAy (p,w, r; g (r))
holds. Moreover, as
∂Ψ (r, g)
∂g = pAy (p,w, r; g (r)) + (1 + g) pA
∂ [I − (1 + g)A]−1 zb (p,w, r)
∂g
+pA
∂ [I − (1 + g)A]−1 za (p,w, r)
∂g − (1 + g) pA [I − (1 + g)A]
−1 za (p,w, r)
(1 + g)
2
= pA [I − (1 + g)A]−1 zb (p,w, r) + (1 + g) pA
∂ [I − (1 + g)A]−1 z (p,w, r; g)
∂g
> 0,
it follows that g (r) is unique. Thus, for each r ∈ [0, R), we obtain a stationary
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price vector (p (r) , w (r) , r) such that
p (r) = (1 + r) p (r)A+ w (r)L;
y (p (r) , w (r) , r) = zb (p (r) , w (r) , r) +
za (p (r) , w (r) , r)
1 + g (r)
+ (1 + g (r))Ay (p (r) , w (r) , r) ,
p (r) za (p (r) , w (r) , r)
1 + r
= (1 + g (r)) p (r)Ay (p (r) , w (r) , r) ; and
Ly (p (r) , w (r) , r) = ωl.
In summary, the above-specified profile ((p (r) , w (r) , r) , y (p (r) , w (r) , r) , g (r))
satisfies all of the conditions for a stationary growth equilibrium.
Now, we are ready to discuss the indeterminacy of the Sraffian station-
ary growth equilibrium. The definition of indeterminacy can be given ana-
logical to Definition 4. Let the profile ((p,w, r) , y, g) be a Sraffian stationary
growth equilibrium. Let us take any ε > 0. Take r0 ( 6= r), which is suffi-
ciently close to r such that k(p0, w0, r0) , (p,w, r)k < ε holds, where w0 ≡ 1− r0R
and p0 ≡ w0L (I − (1 + r0)A)−1. Then, by Theorem 3, there exists a sta-
tionary growth equilibrium ((p0, w0, r0) , y0, g0). As r0 6= r, it is obvious that
(p0, w0, r0) 6= (p,w, r). This implies that ((p,w, r) , y, g) is indeterminate. Thus,
we can summarize:
Theorem 4: Let h(A,L) ;ωl;ui be an overlapping generation economy as spec-
ified above. Then, the corresponding Sraffian stationary growth equilibrium
((p,w, r) , y, g) under this economy is indeterminate.
Note that Theorem 4 can also be established by a standard proof similar
to that developed for Theorem 1. Developing this proof parallel to the case of
Theorem 1, we obtain the following system of 2n+ 1 equations:
p¯ = (1 + r) p¯A+ wL; (1*)
(I − (1 + g)A) y = z (p¯, w, r; g) , (2*);
(1 + g)p¯Ay =
p¯za (p¯, w, r)
1 + r
. (3*)
Then, since the system of 2n+1 equations has 2n+2 unknown variables, it has
freedom of degree one.
It is not difficult to see that the Jacobian matrix of the system of equations
(1*), (2*), and (3*) has rank 2n+1. Therefore, we can show the indeterminacy
of the Sraffian stationary growth equilibrium by applying the implicit function
theorem.
Note that the above result is due to the fact that the growth rate g is
endogenously determined and so is an unknown variable. If the growth rate g is
exogenously given as a parameter, then the system of equations (1*), (2*) with
a fixed number g > −1, and (3*) has only 2n+ 1 unknown variables. Again, it
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is not difficult to see that the Jacobian matrix of the system of equations (1*),
(2*) with a fixed number g > −1, and (3*) has rank 2n+ 1. Therefore, we can
show the determinacy of such an equilibrium by applying the implicit function
theorem:
Corollary 1: Let h(A,L) ;ωl;ui be an overlapping generation economy as spec-
ified above. Then, the Sraffian stationary growth equilibrium with an exogenous
growth rate g 6= 0, ((p,w, r) , y), under this economy is determinate.
Note that, as in the case of steady-state equilibrium, the Sraffian stationary
growth equilibrium with an exogenous growth rate is not necessarily guaranteed
to exist. This is because each agent’s optimization program is solved indepen-
dently of the exogenous growth rate g 6= 0.
8.2 Openness and genericity
Now let’s investigate the openness and genericity of a parameter set of economies
in which every Sraffian stationary growth equilibrium is regular.
For the demand functions of two generations za, zb, labor endowment ω`
and for h = (h1, h2, ..., hn, ho) ∈ Rn+1, define a perturbed demand function as
zbi (h) ≡ zbi (p,w, r) +
w
pi
hi, z
a
i (h) ≡ zai (p,w, r) +
w
pi
ho,
zi(p,w, r) ≡ zbi (p,w, r) +
zai (p,w, r)
1 + g
for each i = 1, 2, ..., n, and ωl(h) ≡ ω`+
Pn
i=1 hi+
nho/1+g
1+r . Hence the perturbed
demand function is represented as,
zi(h) ≡ zbi (h) +
zai (h)
1 + g
for each i = 1, 2, ..., n. The perturbed functions satisfy Walras’ law and homo-
geneity.
Define a function F on the space of n+1 price variables (p¯, w, r) where p¯ ≡
(p1, ...pn−1, 1) is the normalized price, there are n quantity variables (y1, y2, ...yn),
the growth rate of investments is g and add the parameter set (A,L, h) toward
R2n+1, i.e.
F : Rn−1++ ×R++ ×R+ ×Rn++ ×R×Rn
2
+ ×Rn++ ×Rn+1 → R2n+1
such that
F (p¯, w, r, y, g, A, L, h) =
⎡
⎣
z(h)− [I − (1 + g)A] y
p¯− (1 + r)p¯A− wL
(1 + g) p¯Ay − p¯z
a(h)
1+r
⎤
⎦
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where p¯ and L are row vectors, y is a column vector, and R is the maximum
rate of profit.
A regular stationary growth equilibrium is a normalized equilibrium vector
(p¯, w, r, y, g) such that zero is a regular value of F , i.e. JacobianDF has full-rank
at (p¯, w, r, y, g).5 An economy (A,L, h) is regular if every normalized stationary
growth equilibrium vector (p¯, w, r, y, g) is regular.6 Denote the set of economies
as P and the set of regular economies as PR.
5 The system of equation ; (1*), ; (2*) and ; (3*) has 2n + 1 equations and n + 1 price
variables (p1, ..., pn−1, w, r). Hence the growth rate g and quantity variables (y1, ..., yn) are
to be determined simultaneously in the Jacobian. Including perturbed parameters, for any
(A,L, h), (p¯,y,w,r,g)(FA,L,h(p¯, w, r, y, g)) is given by:


(i) [(1 + g)A− I] p¯z(h) wz(h) rz(p,w, r)
0 0 I∗n−1 − (1 + r)AT−n −LT −p¯A
pAy (1 + g)pA (ii) (iii) (iv)


where
I∗n−1 =

In−1
0

and
(i) =gz(p,w, r)−
−who
(1 + g)2
[p−11 , ..., p
−1
n ]
T +Ay
(ii) = [(1+g)A−ny]
T− 1
1 + r
[za1 (p,w, r)+
n
i=1
pi
∂zai (p,w, r)
∂p1
, ..., zan−1(p,w, r)+
n
i=1
pi
∂zai (p,w, r)
∂pn−1
],
(iii) = −
n
1
[
pi
1 + r
∂zai (p,w, r)
∂w
]− nh
o
1 + r
.
(iv) =
n
1
pi
1 + r
[
zai (p,w, r)
1 + r
−
∂zai (p,w, r)
∂r
] +
nwho
(1 + r)2
.
In addition, p¯z(h) and wz(h) are calculated as:
p¯z(h) =p¯z(p¯, w, r)−


w
p21
(h1 +
ho
1+g
) 0 ... 0
0 w
p22
(h2 +
ho
1+g
) 0 ... 0
. . .
0 ... 0 w
p2n−1
(hn−1 +
ho
1+g
)
0 ... 0 0


,
wz(h) =wz(p,w, r) + [
1
p1
(h1 +
ho
1 + g
),
1
p2
(h2 +
ho
1 + g
), ...,
1
pn−1
(hn +
h0
1 + g
)]T .
6Likewise, we can define an economy (A,L, h) is as regular if every normalized steady-state
equilibrium vector (p¯, w, r, y) is regular. Then, as similar to the proof of Theorem 5 discussed
below, it can be shown that such a regular economy is open and has full measure.
26
Theorem 5: PR is open and has full measure in P .
Proof. The full measure claim of PR is proven by the transversality theorem.
Trivially, the function F defined above is smooth on the domain including all
(p¯, w, r, y, g) and parameter (A,L, h) in Rn−1++ ×R++ ×R+ ×Rn++ ×R×Rn
2
+ ×
Rn++×Rn+1. If zero is a regular value of F at (p¯, w, r, y; g) and the JacobianDF
with respect to A,L, h has full rank 2n + 1, then except a set of (A0, L0, h0) ∈
Rn2+ × Rn++ ×Rn+1 of measure zero, FA,L,h(p¯, w, r, y, g) : Rn−1++ × R++ × R+ ×
Rn++ × R → R2n+1 has 0 as a regular value. Define the Jacobian DF with
respect to (A,L, h), which is denoted by DA,L,hF , as below:
DA,L,hF =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
w
p1
w
(1+g)p1
(1 + g)yT
. . .
. . . 0
w
pn
w
(1+g)pn
(1 + g)yT
0 (v) −wIn
0 − nw1+r (vi) 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
where the row vector yT is the transpose of y, In is the n× n identity matrix,
(v)= −(1+r)[p1In ... pn−1In, In] is n×n2 and (vi) = (1+g)[p1yT ... pnyT ] is 1×n2
matrix.7 The first n + 1 columns are for (h1, ..., hn, ho), the next n2 columns
are for the components of A and the last n columns are for the components of
L.
To see the full-measureness of regular economy PR, it is sufficient to check
that DA,L,hF has full rank. Observe that the first n× (n+ 1) submatrix of the
upper-left is nonsingular. Next, the shape of (v) and −wIn guarantees n nonzero
rows which are linearly independent. The bottom row will also be nonzero in
elementary column operation. Therefore, DA,L,hF has full rank. Since we have
shown thatDA,L,hF has full row rank at all (p¯, w, 1+r, y, g, A, L, h) with F = 0,
then by the transversality theorem, FA,L,h(p¯, w, r, y, g) has 0 as a regular value
almost everywhere in P . In other words, PR has full measure.
As for the openness, consider the contrary case. Suppose PR is not open.
Then there would be a sequence {(A,L, h)k} of non-regular economies con-
verging to a regular economy (A,L, h)∗ ∈ PR. Correspondingly, there exists a
sequence of non-regular equilibria {(p¯, r, w, y, g)k} which converges to a regular
equilibrium (p¯, r, w, y, g)∗ at (A,L, h)∗. Then the corresponding Jacobian ma-
trices DF(A,L,h)k(p¯, w, r, y, g)k of 2n+1 rows and 2n+2 columns exist, as seen
7 Here, each piIn is n× n matrix:
piIn =


pi 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 pi

 .
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in footnote 4, which have less than full rank. For a Jacobian matrix, we can pick
2n+2 separate square submatrices of order 2n+1. The determinants of square
submatrices of order 2n+1 are all zero. Now we can define a continuous function,
say c, from the set of Jacobian matrices to the set of 2n+2-dimensional vectors
whose components are determinants of square submatrices derived from the Ja-
cobian DFA,L,h. Since c(DFA,L,h) = (0, ..., 0) ∈ R2n+2 for any DFA,L,h of less
than full rank, c(DF(A,L,h)k(p¯, w, r, y, g)k) = (0, ..., 0)k → (0, ..., 0) ∈ R
2n+2 as
k →∞.
Since {(0, ..., 0)k} converging to (0, ..., 0) is closed in R2n+2 and c is con-
tinuous, the inverse image c−1 ({(0, ..., 0)k}) =
©
DF(A,L,h)k(p¯, w, r, y, g)k
ª
is
closed. Its elements are Jacobian matrices from P\PR of less than full rank.
Since
©
DF(A,L,h)k(p¯, w, r, y, g)k
ª
is closed,DF(A,L,h)∗(p¯, w, r, y, g)∗ is contained
in
©
DF(A,L,h)k(p¯, w, r, y, g)k
ª
.
Note that c(DF(A,L,h)∗(p¯, w, r, y, g)∗) = (0, ..., 0) ∈ R
2n+2. This implies that
the converging point of the sequence
©
DF(A,L,h)k(p¯, w, r, y, g)k
ª
, each element
of which is correspondingly defined from (A,L, h)k ∈ P\PR, must also have
less than full rank. In other words, the convergent point of the sequence of
non-regular economies must be also non-regular. This contradicts to our initial
assumption. Therefore the set of regular economies PR is open.
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